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Abstract
We develop a principal-agent model in which the health authority acts as a principal for
both a patient and a general practitioner (GP). The goal of the paper is to investigate the
relative merits of gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping systems and to analyze the role of the
quality of patient information and referral pressure in determining which model dominates.
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suﬃciently high pressure for referral. At the same time, for a non-gatekeeping system to
dominate, the quality of the patient information should not be extreme: neither too bad
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http://www.upo.es/econ 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This work is a contribution to the current debate over the beneﬁts and drawbacks from enhancing
the gatekeeping role of General Practitioners (henceforth, GPs). The paper aims at studying the
role of GPs as ﬁlters for secondary care, emphasizing the implications that patients’ information
and referral pressure have for health authorities.
Currently, two main types of health care systems can be observed in most European countries.
In some of them, like Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, or the United Kingdom, a gatekeping
system exists and, hence, GPs control access to other levels of health care. There are other
countries, like Belgium, Finland, France or Germany, where the gatekeeping role of the GP is
very limited, as patients have a free choice of GPs and specialists.
Despite this heterogeneity, it has often been argued that a system in which GPs act as
gatekeepers to specialist care leads to lower health care costs.1 This explains the interest in
gatekeeping both in Eastern European countries, where they are reforming their health care
systems (Hebing (1997)), and in the United States, where gatekeeping has been a central strategy
in the cost-containment initiatives of managed care organizations (Wolf and Gorman (1996)).
It has been widely recognized in the literature that the regulation of the GPs and the
incentive structures they face have signiﬁcant implications for costs in health care systems (see,
for instance, Scott (2000)). In particular, the incentives provided to the GPs determine their
two main decisions in relation to overall health costs: diagnosis and referral.2
The work by García-Mariñoso and Jelovac (2003) is the ﬁrst that provides a uniform theo-
retical framework in which the identiﬁcation of the optimal payment system is used to compare
gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping systems. They ﬁnd that the optimal GP’s payment scheme
requires a combination of cost-sharing components: cost sharing of the GP’s treatment and
a bonus for not referring. This contract yields the right diagnosis and recommendation in-
centives to the GP. They show that, when GPs’ incentives matter, gatekeeping is superior to
non-gatekeeping.
However, there exist other elements apart from GPs’ incentives that should be considered
when comparing the pros and cons of these two diﬀerent systems to access secondary care. First,
the issue of how to discipline patients who might strategically choose to visit a specialist or a GP
should be addressed. Secondly, the quality of the patients’ information must also play a role,
s i n c ei fp a t i e n t sh a v eas u ﬃciently accurate information on their problem, allowing them to freely
choose their medical provider, may be more eﬃcient than a compulsory visit to the GP. Thirdly,
patients’ information may turn into patients’ pressure to obtain a referral to specialist treatment.
1See, for instance, Franks et al. (1992), Martin et al. (1989) and Starﬁeld (1994).
2There is empirical evidence that GPs’ behavior is inﬂuenced by economic motives. See, for instance, Croxson
et al. (2001) on the referrals of GPs in the UK, and Iversen and Lurås (2000) on the volume of services provided
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about whether they want to be referred or prescribed medication (Armstrong et al. (1991)), and
also that in many occasions, this may alter GPs’ decisions. For instance, Fleming (1992), in a
European study of referrals, reported that pressure from patients about whether they should be
referred “inﬂuenced” between 30 percent and 60 percent of referrals.
The goal of this paper is to investigate the relative merits of gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping
in a model that embeds all these elements. Following the approach that GPs’ contracts should
include appropriate diagnosis and referral incentives, we analyze the role of patient information
and referral pressure in determining which system dominates.
The model used here is a principal-agent model in which the health authority acts as a
principal for both a patient and a GP. Two types of informational asymmetries arise: First,
moral hazard (as neither GP’s diagnosis decision nor diagnosis outcome are veriﬁable). Second,
the selection of medical provider among types of patients is ex-ante unknown to the principal
(as patients’ belief about their severity is private information).
Co-payments are generally used to avoid patients’ overconsumption of medical services. In
some countries, co-payments have been introduced as ﬁnancial incentives at the patients’ side
to stimulate the gatekeeping role of GPs.3 This is in line with the role co-payments play in our
model. We introduce them to solve the selection problem and avoid a systematic utilization of
specialist treatment by patients in non-gatekeeping.
We ﬁnd that if we want to provide the GP with diagnosis and recommendation incentives,
non-gatekeeping is optimal only if there is a suﬃciently high pressure for referral. The reason
is that when this pressure is high enough, a gatekeeping system may be unable to provide the
GP with right incentives, while this is not a problem under non-gatekeeping.
In addition to this, for a non-gatekeeping to be the best system, the quality of the pa-
tient’s information should not be extreme. If patients’ signal is highly uninformative, patients’
self-referral is very ineﬃcient. Patients’ expected health losses are very high, and so are spe-
cialist costs, due to the high proportion of unnecessary visits to the specialist. When patients’
information is extremely accurate, non-gatekeeping is convenient both from the perspective of
patients and specialists costs. However, this advantage is outweighed by the fact that in non-
gatekeeping the accuracy of the patient’s beliefs fosters primary care costs. Since only those
patients who think they are mild cases visit the primary provider, the patient’s belief is a source
of pre-diagnosis information that reduces the incentives of the GP to make a costly diagnosis.
Although primary care is being recognized as the mainstay of many health care systems in
3In Belgium, for instance, from 2002 onwards patients pay lower co-payments if they register with one speciﬁc
GP. Moreover, very recently, the co-payments for those patients who go to the specialist directly, without having
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Malcomson (2004) discusses which contractual agreements are most eﬀective at inducing
gatekeepers to exert eﬀort in diagnosis. He shows that implementing incentive contracts is not
worthwhile when patients are allowed to choose between a gatekeeper with an incentive contract
and one without.
García-Mariñoso and Jelovac (2003) advocate in favour of gatekeeping systems, whenever
G P ’ si n c e n t i v e sm a t t e r .I nt h ep r e s e n tp a p e rw es h o wt h a t ,w h e nt h er o l eo fp a t i e n ti n f o r m a t i o n
and referral pressure is also considered, this general prevalence of gatekeeping is no longer true.
Brekke et al. (2005) contributes to the discussion on gatekeeping by analizing the competition
eﬀects amongst secondary care providers that arise when GPs are equipped with a gatekeeping
role. Also, from this perspective, the implementation of a gatekeeping system need not be always
socially desirable.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, only García-Mariñoso (1999) provides a description of
how the insurer can regulate access to specialist care by manipulating the patients’ insurance
contract. There are two main diﬀerences between her approach and ours. First, she does not
take the quality of the information of the patients into account, as the patient’s signal is always
perfectly correlated with the true probability of facing a given severity. In exchange, in our paper,
the fraction of patients that visit the specialist directly is exogenously given (those who believe
to be high-severity), while in García-Mariñoso the optimal screening of patients is endogenously
determined.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the following section, we present the model.
Section 3 analyzes both the patient’s and the GP’s behavior. In Section 4 we derive the optimal
patient’s co-payment levels and the optimal GP’s payment contract. Section 5 compares the
two institutional frameworks. Finally, in Section 6, we present our conclusions.
2 The Model
Our model is inspired by Jelovac (2001) and García-Mariñoso and Jelovac (2003). There are
three agents in our economy: a patient, a GP and the regulator or health authority. In fact,
there is implicitly a fourth agent: a provider of specialist medical attention, but we will consider
him as a passive agent, as the analysis of his behavior is out of the scope of this article.4
The patient.
The patient suﬀers from a certain illness. The severity of the illness is measured by a random
variable s. W ea s s u m et h a ts can only take two values: s
¯
and ¯ s, which indicate whether the
patient is either low or high-severity. For the s a k eo fs i m p l i c i t y ,w ea s s u m et h a tb o t ht y p e so f
illnesses are equally likely. The patient is perfectly aware that he is ill but does not know just
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The patient, therefore, seeks health care from a medical provider. He will demand medical at-
tention either from a GP or from a specialist. This decision depends on the existing institutional
framework. In gatekeeping the patient has no choice and has to visit the GP. In non-gatekeeping,
however, the patient can choose to visit either the GP or the specialist.
We consider the patient to be endowed with a utility function that is separable in health and
income. The patient’s health status and his available income are the same in all contingencies
(minor or major illness). Therefore, in this model, maximizing the patient’s expected utility
is equivalent to minimizing the value of his expected costs. These costs come from two main
sources. First, from the health loss (l) that the patient suﬀers when he receives primary care
and a referral is necessary. These losses can be understood as the cost of waiting for specialist
treatment. Secondly, the patient may also incur a monetary cost. In non-gatekeeping, where
patients can freely choose their medical provider, the health authority has to set certain co-
payments to induce the patient to enter the health care sector either on the primary level, or
directly on the secondary one. The set of co-payments is denoted by (pg,p gs,p s) ∈ R3
+, where pg
measures the monetary cost of visiting the GP, pgs represents the cost of visiting the specialist
with a GP referral and, ﬁnally, ps is paid in case the patient decides to access specialist medical
care directly.5
As we have already claimed in the Introduction, there exists empirical evidence suggesting
that the pressure of the patient to obtain a referral may alter GP’s behavior. We model this
pressure as the probability that the patient rejects GP’s treatment. In case of doing so, he will
demand private specialist treatment at a cost f.6 This way, he avoids any potential health loss,
although he bears the full cost of receiving specialist treatment. In particular, we assume that
there is a fraction r of patients that are obstinate, in the sense that the GP can not convince
them that they have a minor illness when they believe they have a major one. These patients
always decide to reject GP’s treatment and pay for private services even if, as we will see later,
it is worthwhile for them to follow GPs’ recommendation.
The General Practitioner.
We consider that the GP is able to cure a patient only if the severity of the condition is low,
while the specialist can heal both levels of severity. Whenever the GP receives a patient, he is
5These co-payments are only introduced to discipline patient’s behavior and, hence, they do not reﬂect the
cost of the service.
6The reader should note that in this work we are ruling out the existence of a set of potential patients who











































We also consider that δ > β, i.e. once the GP has made a diagnosis, his level of knowledge about
the true severity of the illness exceeds that of the patient. For simplicity, we focus on the case
in which both sd and sb are correlated with s, but patient’s and GP’s errors are conditionally
independent. In making a diagnosis, the GP incurs a disutility, that we denote by cd.
As part of the diagnosis, the physician also observes the patient’s belief about his true con-
dition.7 This implies that, although patient’s and GP’s errors are conditionally independent,
GPs’ posterior beliefs are positively correlated with patient information. Combining the diag-
nosis with this piece of information, the GP should decide on treating the patient or referring
him to the specialist. If the GP prescribes a treatment that cures the patient, the game ends.
Otherwise, the patient is referred to the specialist, bearing a health loss in those cases where
the GP has not referred him directly.
As both the GP’s decision to diagnose a patient and the diagnosis are hard to verify, the
incentives included in the GP’s payment contract will crucially determine his behavior. We take
a contract structure similar to the one proposed by González (2004). GP’s contract, hence,
consists of three non-negative components (R,T,B). R is the amount of money that the GP
receives when the patient is referred directly to the specialist. If, instead, the GP proposes
treatment to the patient, he receives a payment T.In this latter case, if the patient accepts GP’s
treatment, the GP receives a bonus B provided the patient is eventually not referred to specialist
treatment. This payment structure contains: (i) a capitation component or payment per visit
(min{T,R}), (ii) a cost-sharing of the GP’s treatment (whenever R>Tin equilibrium) and
( i i i )ab o n u sf o rn o tr e f e r r i n g(B) that can be interpreted as a premium for cost-containment.8
The Health Authority.
The third agent involved in the model is the health authority. The health authority pays the
7Alternatively, we could have assumed that the GP acquires information about the patient’s belief, even if he
does not make a diagnosis. However, we consider this alternative less appealing as, constructing the model that
way, gatekeeping system would trivially be more costly than non-gatekeeping, as the latter would be simply a
subset (when s
¯
b)o ft h ef o r m e r .
8T h er e m u n e r a t i o nm e t h o d sf o rG P sd i ﬀer across countries and experimentation with their contractual arrange-
ments abounds. In general the reforms depart from strict capitation or fee-for-service payments and introduce
additional components aimed at containing costs and reducing referrals to hospital. In the UK the former GPs
fundholders were allocated a budget to provide primary health care and purchase some of the specialist services
for which they referred patients. The “unspent” share of their budget could be reinvested in their own practice.
In Italy GPs’ contractual arrangements combine capita t i o nw i t ha na d d i t i o n a lp a y m e n tt h a tr e w a r d sG P sw i t h
a proportion of the savings generated from meeting expenditure targets, including the cost of pharmaceuticals,
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the specialist.
We denote by cs the costs of the specialist services, which include not only the treatment
costs but also the payments made to the specialist. As the costs of treatment by a specialist are
generally higher than the costs of treatment by a GP, we normalize the latter to zero.
The health authority designs the GP’s contract and the patient’s level of co-payments so
as to minimize expected social costs. Such costs are the sum of the ﬁnancial costs both from
primary and specialist health care (i.e. expected treatment costs and payoﬀst ob o t ht h eG P
and the specialist) and the patient’s expected costs (which includes both his expected health
losses and his monetary expenses).9
Our aim is to study whether it is socially useful to use patients’ information as a mechanism
for provider selection. Hence, the level of co-payments will be designed to ensure that patients
use their own information and visit the specialist directly only if they believe a GP will not
heal them. As we are interested in providing the GP with right diagnosis and recommendation
incentives, we focus on contracts that induce the GP to diagnose and follow the diagnosis, i.e.
to treat the patient whenever the signal received from the diagnosis is s
¯
d and refer him if ¯ sd.
We denote by CGP the expected ﬁnancial costs associated with primary care, CSp those for
specialist treatment and CPat the patients’ expected costs.
Timing.
The timing of the game consists of the following stages. First, the health authority sets the
GP’s payment contract, which he can either accept or reject (in which case the game ends),
and also sets the patient’s level of co-payments. Secondly, the severity of the patient’s illness is
realized, and he seeks health care from a medical provider. If the patient visits the specialist the
game ends. If he visits the GP, then the doctor makes a diagnosis, which provides him with a
signal about the patient’s severity. In the third stage, after observing the signal, the GP decides
whether to treat the patient himself or to refer the patient to the specialist. If he decides to
refer the patient, the game ends. In case he decides to treat him, the patient may accept or
reject this treatment. If he rejects it or, in case he accepts, if the patient recovers his health,
the game ends. Otherwise, the patient is referred to the specialist.
As usual, we solve the game by backward induction.
9One should note that: (i) the health authority internalizes the cost of the private treatment, through patients’
expected costs, and (ii) although co-payments appear in the model only as costs for patients, all our qualitative
results would remain valid if we also include co-payments as revenues for the health authority, provided there is
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In this section we characterize the behavior of the patient and the GP in our model. First, we
analyze how the level of co-payments determines the decision of the patient to either visit the
GP, or directly request specialist medical treatment. This analysis only applies when considering
systems in which patients are not obliged to compulsorily visit the GP. Second, we set out to
derive the conditions that the GP’s payment contract has to fulﬁll in order to ensure that the GP
decides to costly diagnose the patient and, afterwards, follow the diagnosis. Figure 1 provides
the extensive form representation of the game under analysis.
[Insert Figure 1]
3.1 Patient’s Behavior
In our model, the patient can be either high-severity or low-severity, with an ex-ante equal
probability. However, once the patient observes his own symptoms and is aware of his personal
circumstances, he is able to update these probabilities. Then, the probabilities that the patient
























In non-gatekeeping the patient has the choice between two alternatives: go to the specialist
directly, or go ﬁrst to the GP. If the patient goes to the specialist directly, his cost is given by
the co-payment he has to pay ps, but no health loss is borne. If the patient goes ﬁrst to the GP
he always pays pg and, then, if he is eventually referred to the specialist pgs. Moreover, he may
also suﬀer from a health loss whenever he receives treatment from the GP that does not heal
him. Those patients who are obstinate always reject GP’s treatment if they believe to be in a
severe condition. In this case, they do not incur either pgs or the health loss l, but they have to
pay the private fee f.
With the help of Figure 1 patients’ costs in any circumstance can be easily computed.11 Take
ﬁrst belief s
¯















), and pg+pgs if the GP’s diagnosis is wrong (Pr(¯ sd|s
¯






) he incurs pg+pgs if the GP’s diagnosis is right (Pr(¯ sd|¯ s))a n dpg+l+pgs















). If the GP’s diagnosis is wrong (Pr(s
¯
d|¯ s)),
10See Appendix B for a more detailed explanation.
11Throughout this sub-section it is considered that the GP behaves optimally, i.e. makes a diagnosis and follows
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incurs pg + f if he is obstinate, and pg otherwise. Finally, if the patient is low-severity and the










) the patient incurs pg + pgs.
Hence, in comparing the patient’s expected costs when demanding ﬁrst GP’s attention, or
direct specialist care, we conclude the following:
(i) If s
¯
b, a patient chooses to go ﬁrst to the GP whenever:
ps ≥ pg + β (1 − δ)pgs +( 1− β)(pgs +( 1− δ)l).
(ii) If ¯ sb,anon-obstinate patient chooses to go to the specialist directly whenever:
ps ≤ pg + β (pgs +( 1− δ)l)+( 1− β)(1− δ)pgs.
(iii) If ¯ sb,a nobstinate patient chooses to go to the specialist directly whenever:
ps ≤ pg + β (δpgs +( 1− δ)f)+( 1− β)((1 − δ)pgs + δf).
Taking into account that the co-payment levels have to provide appropriate incentives to
any patient, we obtain the following lemma.12
Lemma 1 A patient visits the specialist directly when ¯ sb and goes to the GP when s
¯
b if and only
if:
• ps − pg ≤ β (pgs +( 1− δ)l)+( 1− β)(1− δ)pgs and
• ps − pg ≥ β (1 − δ)pgs +( 1− β)(pgs +( 1− δ)l).
This lemma shows that the higher the quality of the patient information is the milder both
restrictions are. This is a natural result since, what the health authority is trying to induce
through the co-payments is, precisely, for the patient to use his own information when selecting
the medical provider. The more accurate this information is, therefore, the smaller the expected
costs of his self-referral.
3.2 General Practitioner’s Behavior
In our model, the GP faces a population of patients that can be either high or low-severity, with
ex-ante the same probability. In order to update these probabilities, the GP uses two pieces
of information: the patient’s beliefs and the signal received from the diagnosis. It is worth
mentioning that, in order to avoid dealing with information revelation issues, we rule out the
possibility that the physician wrongly observes the patient’s belief.
12In order to ensure that non-obstinate patients always ﬁnd it optimal to accept GP’s treatment, we are
implicitely considering that the private alternative is suﬃciently costly. In particular f must exceed the patient’s
expected costs associated with accepting GPs’ treatment in the most demanding contingency, i.e. when the
patient receives signal ¯ s
b Formally, this requires that f>
β(1−δ)
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.
(3)
Once the GP has diagnosed the true severity of the condition, he then decides on the best option
for the patient. The doctor always has two alternatives: treat the patient or refer him to the
specialist.14
If the GP refers the patient to the specialist he always receives R. If the GP recommends
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d ∩ ¯ sb¢
) and he does not reject the treatment (with a probability (1 − r)). Finally, when






d ∩ ¯ sb¢
(1 − r).
In comparing the diﬀerent payments that the GP receives from prescribing either treatment





b, the GP treats the patient whenever R − T ≤
Bδβ




d and ¯ sb, the GP treats the patient whenever R − T ≤
Bδ(1−β)(1−r)
δ(1−β)+(1−δ)β and refers him
otherwise.
(iii) If ¯ sd and s
¯
b, the GP refers the patient whenever R − T ≥
B(1−δ)β
(1−δ)β+δ(1−β) and treats him
otherwise.




From these conditions we see, ﬁrst, that the diﬀerence between the two “safe” payments:
R for a direct referral to the specialist and T for recommending treatment, has to be strictly
positive. This means that the contract should include some cost sharing of the GP’s treatment.
Moreover, the premium B plays an important role in avoiding a systematic referral of patients.
It is also worth mentioning that the conditions that the GP’s payment scheme has to fulﬁll
in order to eﬀectively induce him to follow the diagnosis are diﬀerent for the two institutional
frameworks. In non-gatekeeping, since only patients who believe to be low-severity visit the GP,
13See Apendix B for a more detailed explanation.
14Throughout this sub-section it is considered that patients behave optimally, i.e. in non-gatekeeping the patient
demands primary attention only if s
¯
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to be fulﬁlled. This leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The GP always follows the diagnosis if and only if:
• In non-gatekeeping:
R − T ≥
B (1 − δ)β




R − T ≤
Bδβ





R − T ≥
B (1 − δ)β




R − T ≤
Bδ (1 − β)(1− r)




In gatekeeping the GP faces all kind of patients. In order to ensure that the GP always follows
his diagnosis, we have to induce him to do so even in those cases in which this is contrary to the
patient’s beliefs. As a result, the higher the referral pressure (measured by r) the more diﬃcult
to induce the GP to stick to his diagnosis. In non-gatekeeping, the GP always receives patients
who think they are low-severity. This implies that there is no pressure for referral, what makes
the restrictions less demanding.
It can be shown that for both gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping systems, the higher the
precision of the GP’s diagnosis the milder the restrictions are. This eﬀect has an intuitive
interpretation as it implies that it is easier to induce the GP to follow the diagnosis as it
becomes more accurate.
In our model, the GP receives neither his signal of the patient’s severity nor the patient’s
one until Stage 3 of the game. Before this stage, therefore, the GP has to decide whether to
make a diagnosis or not, and what to do in case he does not make it (either systematically treat
or refer the patient). When the GP decides to diagnose the patient, it could be the case that,
afterwards, he might decide not to follow the diagnosis. When the conditions written in Lemma
2 hold, however, we can ensure that the GP will stick to the diagnosis.
The derivation of the GP’s expected utility when the GP diagnoses the patient and follows
the diagnosis (U), for both gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping systems, is detailed in Appendix
C. The simpliﬁed structure of the GP’s expected utilities is given by:
- In non-gatekeeping:












[R + T + δB (1 − (1 − β)r)] − cd.
Once the GP’s expected utility has been computed, we can obtain the restrictions that de-
termine when he decides to diagnose the patient. These restrictions come from ensuring that
the above stated utility is higher than both the utility the GP would obtain from systemati-
cally referring the patient (R) or from systematically treating him:
¡
T + 1
2B (1 − (1 − β)r)
¢
in
gatekeeping, or (T + Bβ) in non-gatekeeping.
The following lemma summarizes the GP’s decision of making a diagnosis.
Lemma 3 The GP decides to make a diagnosis if and only if:
• In non-gatekeeping:
R − T ≥
B (1 − δ)β + cd




R − T ≤
Bδβ − cd





R − T ≥ 2cd +( 1− δ)B (1 − (1 − β)r) and (IC
gk
Pd1)
R − T ≤ δB (1 − (1 − β)r) − 2cd. (IC
gk
Pd2)
The conditions to induce diagnosis are, as predictable, more demanding as the cost of the
diagnosis increases. As it is the case in Lemma 2, an increase in the accuracy of the diagnosis
makes the conditions less demanding.
Combining Lemmas 2 and 3 we ﬁnd:
Lemma 4 If the GP decides to diagnose the patient:
• In non-gatekeeping he always follows the diagnosis.
• In gatekeeping he always follows the diagnosis if and only if IC
gk
Fd are fulﬁlled.
In non-gatekeeping we can ensure that, for every value of cd, the conditions that have to be
fulﬁlled for the GP to follow the diagnosis IC
Ngk
Fd are always milder than the ones that induce
him to make a diagnosis IC
Ngk
Pd . This means that, once the GP has decided to diagnose the
patient, he will always follow the diagnosis. In gatekeeping, on the contrary, we cannot ensure
that for every value of cd IC
gk
Fd constraints are always implied by IC
gk
Pd. Therefore, once the GP
has made a diagnosis, he may decide not to use it. This is due to the referral pressure of the
patient. In non-gatekeeping, since all the patients that visit the GP have s
¯
b, there is no problem
of pressure at all.
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¯
d
a n dt or e f e rh i mi f¯ sd:
• In non-gatekeeping it is always possible.




Proof. See Appendix D.
This proposition shows how in non-gatekeeping it is always possible to design a payment
contract that induces the GP to diagnose a patient and follow the diagnosis. In gatekeeping,
however, this is not the case, and the result is determined by the “patients’ pressure”. If the
referral pressure is suﬃciently high, it is impossible for the health authority to ﬁnd values of
R,T and B that simultaneously fulﬁll all the constraints. The reason for it is the following:
Given the high risk of treatment rejection, the minimum value of the bonus B that induces the
GP to treat a patient whenever s
¯
d, is so high that the GP will also be willing to treat a patient
when ¯ sd. Conversely, if the cost-sharing R−T is high enough to induce the GP to refer a patient
if ¯ sd, the GP ends up referring patients for which the diagnosis recommended a treatment.
Proposition 1 has shown an important implication of the presence of patient’s pressure for
referral. A gatekeeping system maybe unsustainable, since it may not be able to provide the
GP with proper incentives to diagnose the patient and follow the diagnosis, while this is not a
problem in non-gatekeeping.
It is interesting to see how the threshold r depends on the quality of the information of the
agents. It can be checked that r is increasing in δ and decreasing in β. This implies that, on the
one hand, the higher the accuracy of the GP’s diagnosis, the more likely a gatekeeping system
is sustainable. On the other hand, as the patient’s belief becomes more precise, the maximum
threshold of pressure compatible with gatekeeping decreases. As the patient gets to know more,
the physician will be less willing to eﬀectively recommend treatment when this is contrary to
the patient’s will.15
4 The Health Authority’s Problem
The health authority aims at minimizing total expected social costs, computed as the sum of the
ﬁnancial costs: both expected costs associated with primary and secondary care (CGP and CSp
respectively), and the patient’s expected costs (CPat). CGP,C Sp and CPat are derived formally
15In spite of this, since β < 1 and δ > β, we can always ensure that r>0. This means that even if the patient’s


































2 (ps + pg + pgs(β (1 − δ)+1− β)+l(1 − β)(1− δ)).
The problem of the health authority can be analyzed in two steps. First, if the system is a
non-gatekeeping one, the health authority has to design the set of co-payments that induce the
patient to visit a specialist directly if and only if he believes he is high-severity. Secondly, the
health authority has to design the contract that provides the GP with incentives to make (and
follow) a diagnosis.16
4.1 The Optimal Co-payment Levels
The co-payment levels set by the health authority will be the ones that minimize CPat.T h e
health authority has to take into account the constraints computed in Lemma 1, which ensure
that the patient only visits the specialist directly when ¯ sb, as well as the fact that the co-payments
have to be non-negative.









ps − pg ≤ β (pgs +( 1− δ)l)+( 1− β)(1− δ)pgs
ps − pg ≥ β (1 − δ)pgs +( 1− β)(pgs +( 1− δ)l)
pg ≥ 0,p gs ≥ 0,p s ≥ 0,
(4)
The following proposition characterizes the optimal level of co-payments.
Proposition 2 If the health authority wants the patient to visit the specialist directly when ¯ sb
a n dt og oﬁrst to the GP if s
¯











s =( 1− β)(1− δ)l.
16T h ep r o b l e mc a nb es o l v e di nt w os t e p ss i n c e :( i )A sl o n ga st h eG Pd i a g n o s e st h ep a t i e n ta n df o l l o w st h e
diagnosis CPat is independent from the GP’s contract; (ii) CGP is not altered by the co-payment levels, provided
they induce the patient to select the medical provider according to his belief about the severity; (iii) CSp depends
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This proposition shows that setting only ps > 0 is enough to induce patients to follow their
belief when choosing their medical provider. This co-payment structure is in line with the very
recent Belgian reform, aimed at enhancing the gatekeeping role of GPs. In the Belgian system,
however, co-payments also have a dissuasive purpose and, therefore, there is a positive (though
small) level of co-payment for visiting the GP or the specialist with a GPs’ referral. This is not
necessary in our model as we do not deal with healthy individuals who make unnecessary visits
to the system.
It is worth noting that this simple structure for the optimal co-payments relies on the fact
that in our model the patient is endowed with a linear utility in money, so income eﬀects are
absent and co-payments do not interfere with ﬁnancial insurance issues.17
Finally, it is straightforward to see that the patient always beneﬁts from a higher accuracy in
the belief about his severity. The reason is two-fold: First, the health losses he bears are lower, as
his self-selection of medical provider is more likely to be correct. Secondly, the monetary expenses
he faces also diminish, as the co-payments needed to induce him an appropriate selection of
medical provider are decreasing in the accuracy of his belief.
4.2 The Optimal Payment Contract
The payments oﬀered to the GP will be the ones that minimize CGP. The health authority has to
consider the fact that the GP’s expected utility (U) cannot be lower than his reservation utility
(normalized to zero) (PC), and also that his liability constraints have to be fulﬁlled (LLC).
We do the analysis within this framework with limited liability constraints for the doctor, i.e.
we impose that, under any circumstance, the doctor must receive a positive payment. Such a
restriction reﬂects the existing limitations on the public liabilities that can be imposed on a
doctor in the execution of his professional duties, which arise from the fact that the result of
any medical treatment is, to a certain extent, unpredictable.
On top of this, we must include the GP’s incentive compatibility constraints (IC)i nt h e
health authority’s optimization program. These are the restrictions that induce the GP to
diagnose the patient and follow the diagnosis (deﬁn e di nL e m m a s2a n d3 ) .
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pending on whether we in non-gatekeeping or gatekeeping.
From Proposition 1 we know that, in gatekeeping, designing a contract that induces the GP
to diagnose the patient and to follow the diagnosis, is only possible provided the referral pressure
is not too high. Hence, hereinafter, we restrict our analysis to values of r such that r ≤ r.
Let us deﬁne e r ≡
δ−β
(1−β)(δ−β+2δβ) ∈ (0, ¯ r). This threshold will determine two regions in which
the impact of the referral pressure aﬀects the costs borne by the health authority diﬀerently.
The following proposition characterizes the GP’s optimal payment contract.
Proposition 3 If the health authority wants the GP to treat the patient when s
¯
d a n dt or e f e r
him if ¯ sd the optimal contract (R,T,B) is as follows:
• In non-gatekeeping:
RNgk =
(1 + (2δ − 1)(1 − β))cd




(2δ − 1)(1 − β)β
.





















(2δ − 1)(1 − (1 − β)r)
.
















1 if r ≤ e r.
(2δ−1)(1−(1−β)r)(δ(1−β)+(1−δ)β)
2[(1−(1−β)r)(δ−(1−δ)(δ(1−β)+(1−δ)β))−δβ] > 1 otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The structure of the GP’s optimal payment contract shares some features with the one in
García-Mariñoso and Jelovac (2003). First, in the worst possible contingency, the GP receives a
capitation payment or a payment per visit that covers the cost of making a diagnosis cd. Second,
to avoid systematic treatment of the patient, the contract includes some cost sharing of the GP’s
treatment (R − T>0). Finally, this premium has to be smaller than the bonus for not referral
(R − T<B ) to compensate for the disincentive eﬀect that a positive R−T has on the decision
of making diagnosis.
We focus now on analyzing how the health authority’s expected primary costs are aﬀected
by our relevant variables (δ,rand β). As expected, both in gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping
these costs are decreasing in the accuracy of the GP’s diagnosis.
The referral pressure (only present in gatekeeping) raises the health authority’s expected
primary costs, but only beyond a certain threshold (e r>0). For values of pressure below e r the
marginal increase in the bonus B to avoid an excessive number of referrals due to pressure, is
compensated by the fact that such a bonus is paid less often at equilibrium. For values beyond
e r, the increase in the bonus is so high that it always appears reﬂected in primary care costs,
what makes these costs be higher the larger the value of r.
Finally, the quality of the patient’s information unambiguously raises expected costs from
primary care. The reason, however, is of a diﬀerent nature in non-gatekeeping and gatekeeping.
In non-gatekeeping patient information generates a problem of “diagnosis substitution”. The
GP acquires information simply by receiving the patient and, then, he has more incentives to
use the patient’s belief as a substitute of his own diagnosis. Hence, inducing the GP to make
a diagnosis becomes more expensive. In gatekeeping, patient information increases health costs
through the referral pressure. For levels of pressure above e r, the more accurate the patient’s
i n f o r m a t i o ni s ,t h em o r ed i ﬃcult that the GP decides to follow the diagnosis. This makes it
more costly for the health authority to avoid an excessive number of referrals.
5 On the Choice of the Optimal System
In this section we provide a discussion on the global problem the health authority faces when
choosing the best system to access health care. As it has become clear throughout the paper,
the quality of the patients’ beliefs, as well as their referral pressure, are the two key elements
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As a ﬁrst step we confront gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping focusing separately on each of the
components of the health authority’s expected costs: patients’ costs, primary care costs and
specialist costs.
First, focusing only on the patient’s side of the problem, we ﬁnd:
Proposition 4 There exists a threshold β∗ < 1, such that:
• If β ≤ β∗, gatekeeping generates lower patients’ expected costs than non-gatekeeping.
• If β > β∗, non-gatekeeping generates lower patients’ expected costs than gatekeeping.
Proof. See Appendix D.
When we concentrate on the patient’s expected losses, non-gatekeeping may be the optimal
system to access medical care. The reason is clear as when patients can freely choose their
medical provider, the health authority relies on their information. As the quality of the patient’s
belief increases, the self-selection becomes perfect and the costs associated with this system
converge to zero. In gatekeeping, on the contrary, as we force patients to disregard their own
belief and always access primary care we do not proﬁt completely from their more accurate
information.
Considering only the GP’s side of the problem, we get:
Proposition 5 Focusing only on primary care expected costs:
• If β < 1+4δ
2+4δ non-gatekeeping is preferred to gatekeeping.
• If β ≥ 1+4δ
2+4δ there exists a threshold r∗ ∈ [˜ r,r] such that:
— If r ≤ r∗ gatekeeping is preferred to non-gatekeeping.
— If r>r ∗ non-gatekeeping is preferred to gatekeeping.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 5 illustrates the trade-oﬀ the health authority faces in terms of primary care
costs. It can be checked that, whenever a patient visits the GP, primary care costs are always
smaller in gatekeeping systems, provided the problem of pressure is not severe. However, these
costs are incurred less often in non-gatekeeping, as not all the patients visit the GP. For this
reason, we ﬁnd that there exist values of β for which non-gatekeeping is less costly, even in the
absence of pressure.
As patient information becomes more accurate, the GP’s incentives to skip the diagnosis
increase, which raises the costs of non-gatekeeping. When β is suﬃciently high, then, gatekeeping
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problematic in non-gatekeeping systems. This is reinforced by the following corollary.
Corollary 1 r∗ is increasing in β.
Patients’ belief generates a problem of informational substitution that is present only in
non-gatekeeping. As the accuracy of this belief increases it is more likely to be in the region
where gatekeeping is superior.
Finally, in terms of expected secondary costs it is direct to see that:
Proposition 6 Expected secondary costs are never lower in non-gatekeeping. Moreover:
• The higher is β, the closer the expected specialist costs in both systems.
• The higher is r, the lower the expected specialist costs in gatekeeping relative to non-
gatekeeping.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Even if, in general, gatekeeping allows savings in specialist costs, the higher the quality of
p a t i e n ti n f o r m a t i o nt h em o r es i m i l a rt h ec o s t si nt h et w os y s t e m s . T h ei m p r o v e m e n ti nt h e
accuracy of self-referrals reduces the over-utilization of specialist treatment in non-gatekeeping.
On the contrary, a higher referral pressure implies more patients leaving the public sector, what
reduces the expected specialist costs in gatekeeping.
5.2 Global Comparison
This sub-section combines the previous results and provides the overall comparison of gatekeep-
ing and non-gatekeeping when both ﬁnancial costs (GP’s and specialist’s costs) and patient’s
costs are simultaneously considered.
We start by considering the two extreme situations concerning the accuracy of the patient’s
information.





both the patient’s expected health
losses and the co-payments are higher in non-gatekeeping and, hence, from the patient’s point of
view gatekeeping dominates. From the GP’s incentives point of view, however, non-gatekeeping




Gp if β → 1
2), but only because the GP is visited less often.





Sp if β → 1
2). Moreover, this diﬀerence in specialist costs will outweigh
any saving that non-gatekeeping may yield in terms of primary care costs, provided specialist
treatment is suﬃciently more costly than primary care. Therefore, in general, systems where
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of non-gatekeeping. First, since patients make no mistakes when selecting their medical provider,
at equilibrium they bear no health losses and the co-payments they pay become negligible.
Secondly, there is not an over-utilization of specialist services, as no low severe patients mis-
interpret their symptoms. A high accuracy of the patient’s information, however, has perverse
eﬀects on GP’s behavior and these are more severe in non-gatekeeping. In particular, when
β → 1 inducing the GP to diagnose the patient and follow the diagnosis becomes prohibitively
expensive when patients can freely choose their provider. This makes that, overall, gatekeeping
dominates.18
For intermediate parameter values, the optimal choice will depend on the relative strength
of two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, non-gatekeeping, even if it allows to successfully use
patient information, will generate a substitution of GP’s diagnosis by patient information. On
the other hand, gatekeeping suﬀers from the problem of patient’s pressure for referral, that may
even make a successful process of diagnosis and treatment/referral choice impossible.
We summarize the discussion above in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If the health authority wants the GP to diagnose the patient and follow the diag-
nosis, and the patient to adequately select his medical provider, then:
• If r>r, gatekeeping is unsustainable. Non-gatekeeping dominates.
• If r ≤ r,t h e n :
— When β → 1
2 gatekeeping dominates.
— For intermediate values of β there exists a threshold in the level of patient’s pressure
such that, for values below it, gatekeeping dominates whereas, for values above it,
the optimal system is a non-gatekeeping one.
— When β → 1 gatekeeping dominates.
Finally, it would be also interesting to study how the choice depends on the GP’s diagnosis
accuracy. In general, what one would expect is that the higher the precision of the GP’s diagnosis,
the more eﬃcient a system with compulsory visits to the GP is, as GP’s information is socially





Sp if δ → 1). This argument is reinforced in our model as the more accurate the
diagnosis is, the milder the agency problem the health authority faces when contracting with
the GP.
18We should recall that, as quality of patient belief increases, the set of values for the pressure that make it
impossible to sustain diagnosis and treatment/referral in gatekeeping also increases. However, we have already










It is important to pause to discuss how gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping compare. The general
lesson that we can draw from our analysis is that if we want to provide the GP with incentives to
diagnose a patient (and follow the diagnosis), non-gatekeeping is optimal if there is a suﬃciently
high pressure for referral. At the same time, for a non-gatekeeping to be the best system,
the quality of the patient’s information should not be extreme: neither too bad (patient’s self-
selection would be very ineﬃcient) nor to good (the GP’s incentives to skip the diagnosis would
be very strong).
The fact that when patients’ information is very precise gatekeeping dominates creates an
apparent puzzle: When the information of the patients is very accurate, it is not worthwhile using
it. This paradoxical recommendation, however, is true because we have restricted our analysis
to those situations in which GPs’ incentives matter. In this case it is not possible to design a
contract that combines this information with the posterior physicians’ diagnosis. In this sense,
in non-gatekeeping, patients’ information becomes a substitute, rather than a complement, for
GPs’ diagnosis.
The last paragraph has an interesting implication. When patients’ information is very pre-
cise, and the health authority wants to proﬁt from it, it is not worthwhile giving incentives to
the GP. Patients’ information should be used instead of, and not in addition to, GPs’ diagno-
sis. In fact, it can be shown that a system in which patients have free choice of their medical
provider but the GP systematically treats without diagnosing, would dominate any other alter-
native. It would allow the health authority to beneﬁt completely from the patient’s information,
eliminating at the same time the GP’s incentive problem.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have developed a principal-agent model in which the health authority acts as a principal for
both a patient and a General Practitioner. In such a model, we have analyzed the role of GPs as
ﬁlters for secondary care. We have followed the conventional wisdom in the literature that GPs’
contracts should include appropriate diagnosis and referral incentives. In this setting, we have
shown that patient information and referral pressure alter the choice of the system to access
specialist care. These two elements drive the results through their direct impact on patients’
expected costs, and also, indirectly, altering GPs’ behavior and, hence, expected primary and
secondary costs.
In terms of policy recommendations, our analysis suggests that whenever GPs incentives mat-
ter, the choice of the system to access secondary care depends on the relative importance of two
features: referral pressure in gatekeeping and GPs’ diagnosis substitution in non-gatekeeping.
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If patients’ signal is highly uninformative, patients’ self-referral is very ineﬃcient. When pa-
tients’ information is extremely accurate any beneﬁt from non-gatekeeping is outweighed by the
increase that the GPs’ diagnosis substitution generates in primary costs.
One insight that emerges from this analysis is that when health authorities want to eﬀectively
use patients’ own information, it may not be worthwhile giving incentives to the GP. This
opens a potentially fruitful path of research: the study of the substitutability/complementarity
relationship between patients and GPs’ information. Such analyses would allow us to go further
in the discussion about the shape of optimal contractual agreements.
One potential criticism to our work is the fact that the quality of the patients’ information
might be hardly observable by health authorities. Still, with chronic or inherited conditions,
repeated illness episodes, or illnesses with symptoms which are easy to recognize, one should
expect a higher accuracy of the patients’ information than that of other types of pathologies.
Finally, we would like to highlight that, although primary care is recognized as the basis of
health care systems in many developed countries, there has been little research by economists
into general practice. We believe this work is a contribution to this scarce literature, as well
as to the ongoing debate over the pros and cons of enhancing the gatekeeping role of General
Practitioners. Certainly, further research, both theoretical and empirical, is needed to assess
the relevance of the relationship between patients’ information, pressure for referral and GP’s
incentives.
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Appendix A. Summary of Notation.
s ∈ {s
¯
, ¯ s} True severity of the illness.
sb ∈ {s
¯





Accuracy of patients’ belief.
l>0 Health loss if patient receives primary care and a referral is necessary.
f>0 Cost of the private treatment alternative.
r ∈ (0,1) Proportion of obstinate patients (rate of referral pressure).
(pg,p gs,p s)
Set of co-payments:
pg when visiting the GP.
pgs when visiting the specialist with a GP’s referral.
ps when visiting directly the specialist.
sd ∈ {s
¯
, ¯ s} GP’s diagnosis outcome.
δ ∈ (β,1) Accuracy of GP’s diagnosis.
cd > 0 Cost of GP’s diagnosis.
(R,T,B)
Physician’s payments:
R if the patient is directly referred to the specialist.
T if the GP recommends treatment.
B bonus if the patient is cured in primary care.
cs > 0 Cost of the specialist services.
CPat Patients’ expected costs.
CGP Expected costs associated with primary care.
CSp Expected costs associated with specialist treatment.
Appendix B. GP’s and Patient’s updated probabilities.
Let us consider three random variables s, sd and sb, such that s, sd, sb ∈ {¯ s,s
¯
}.
Both sd and sb are correlated with s. However, we consider that patient’s and GP’s errors
are not correlated.
In general, ∀i,j ∈ {¯ s,s
¯
} it is true that:
Pr
³
s = i|sb = i
´ Pr
¡
sb = i|s = i
¢
Pr(s = i)
Pr(sb = i|s = i)Pr(s = i)+P r( sb = i|s = j)Pr(s = j)
.


















sd = i ∩ sb = j|s = i
¢













sb = j|s = i
´
.
From here it is straightforward to derive the expressions in (2) and (3).
Appendix C. GP’s expected utility, health authority’s expected ﬁnancial costs
and patient’s expected costs.
In gatekeeping:
GP’s expected utility:
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2 [R + T + δB (1 − (1 − β)r)] − cd.
Health authority’s expected primary care costs:
C
gk
GP = Ugk + cd =
1
2
[R + T + δB (1 − (1 − β)r)].






















2 (2 − δ − r(1 − δ)β).
Finally, patient’s expected costs:
C
gk









































































T +( R − T)[δ +( 1− 2δ)β]+Bδβ − cd.















































Finally, patient’s expected costs:
C
Ngk
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2 (ps + pg + pgs(β (1 − δ)+1− β)+l(1 − β)(1− δ)).
Appendix D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
In non-gatekeeping it is easy to check that, for any value of β and δ, there exist values of R,




Fd are fulﬁlled simultaneously.




Fd 2 are mutually compatible if and only if:
B (1 − δ)β
(1 − δ)β + δ (1 − β)
≤
Bδ (1 − β)(1− r)
δ (1 − β)+( 1− δ)β
This holds if and only if r ≤ r,w i t h¯ r =1−
(1−δ)β
δ(1−β). It can be shown then that, for any r ≤ r,




Fd are fulﬁlled simultaneously.
This completes the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
The optimal level of co-payments is the solution to the program given by (4). The problem
is one of linear programming. Hence, it is well-known that the solution lies on a vertex of the
restricted domain of the program. It can be shown that the restrictions pg ≥ 0,p gs ≥ 0 and
ps −pg ≥ β (1 − δ)pgs+(1− β)(pgs +( 1− δ)l) must be binding at the optimum. The solution,
therefore, is given by p∗
g = p∗
gs =0and p∗
s =( 1− β)(1− δ)l. This completes the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
We compute the optimal payment contract for non-gatekeeping and gatekeeping separately.
To determine the relevant incentive constraints we use Lemmas 2, 3 and 4.





[T +( R − T)[δ +( 1− 2δ)β]+Bδβ]
s.t
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R − T ≥
B(1−δ)β+cd
(1−δ)β+δ(1−β)
















http://www.upo.es/econ First of all, it is straightforward to see that LLC1,LLC2 and LLC3 imply the PC. Therefore,
the health authority chooses the cheapest contract compatible with the LLC and the IC
Ngk
PD .I t
can be checked that LLC1 has to be binding at the optimum. The reasoning is the following:
the health authority’s costs are increasing in T. In addition to this, from the IC
Ngk
Pd we see that
necessarily R>Tand that the minimum value of R compatible with the restriction is increasing
in T. As a result TNgk = cd.
It is easy to see that LLC3 binding cannot be a solution as IC
Ngk
Pd 1 and IC
Ngk
Pd 2 would be
mutually incompatible. Moreover, LLC2 and IC
Ngk
Pd1 binding cannot be a solution as IC
Ngk
Pd 2
would not be fulﬁlled. A similar argument rules out LLC2 and IC
Ngk
Pd 2 binding as a potential
solution.





binding. From here we obtain that:
RNgk =
(1 + (2δ − 1)(1 − β))cd
(2δ − 1)(1 − β)
and BNgk =
cd
(2δ − 1)(1 − β)β
.



















[R + T + δB (1 − (1 − β)r)]
s.t
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R − T ≥ 2cd +( 1− δ)B (1 − (1 − β)r)
R − T ≤ δB (1 − (1 − β)r) − 2cd
R − T ≥
B(1−δ)β
(1−δ)β+δ(1−β)















First of all, it is straightforward to see that LLC1,LLC 2 and LLC3 imply PC. Moreover, by a
similar reasoning as in the non-gatekeeping case, Tgk = cd at the optimum.
Let us deﬁne e r ≡
δ−β
(1−β)(δ−β+2δβ) ∈ (0, ¯ r). We solve the program by distinguishing two cases:









A completely analogous reasoning to the one followed for non-gatekeeping shows that the




Pd2 are binding. The optimal values,



















Fd 2 are implied by IC
gk
Pd 1 and IC
gk
Pd2.
F i r s to fa l l ,i ti ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt os e et h a tn e i t h e rB ≥ 0 nor R ≥ cd can be binding at
equilibrium. Therefore, the optimal contract has to be on one of the vertexes determined by the
set of IC constraints.
By pairwise crossing all the IC constraints we ﬁnd:
- IC
gk
Pd 1 and IC
gk





Fd 1 and IC
gk
Fd 2 binding violates both IC
gk





Pd 2 and IC
gk





Pd 2 and IC
gk





Pd 1 and IC
gk
Fd1 binding, as well as IC
gk
Pd 1 and IC
gk
Fd 2 binding, are shown to be
vertexes of the domain and, hence, potential solutions of the program.





binding are smaller and, hence, this constitutes the optimal contract. Some algebraic manipu-
lations yield:
Rgk =3 cd +
4cd (1 − δ)
2δ − 1
∙
(2δ − 1)(1 − (1 − β)r)(δ (1 − β)+( 1− δ)β)




(2δ − 1)(1 − (1 − β)r)
∙
(2δ − 1)(1 − (1 − β)r)(δ (1 − β)+( 1− δ)β)
2[(1− (1 − β)r)(δ − (1 − δ)(δ (1 − β)+( 1− δ)β)) − δβ]
¸
.
Summarizing the results obtained in the two regions, we can write the GP’s optimal contract in
a gatekeeping system as follows:
Rgk =









1 if r ≤ e r.
(2δ−1)(1−(1−β)r)(δ(1−β)+(1−δ)β)
2[(1−(1−β)r)(δ−(1−δ)(δ(1−β)+(1−δ)β))−δβ] > 1 otherwise.






[4δ +2( Γ(δ,β,r) − 1)].
This completes the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4




Pat for one extreme of the domain
β = 1





















∂β < 0, and C
gk
Pat is also decreasing (and linear) in β. All the conditions above
ensure us that there exists a unique threshold β∗ < 1 such that:










This completes the proof.





GP,a sd e ﬁn e di nP r o p o s i t i o n3 ,w eﬁnd that:





GP , for every value of r.
If β ≥ 1+4δ
2+4δ then:









GP ⇔ Γ(δ,β,r) >
3−2β
4(1−β) − δ.
It can be checked that Γ(δ,β,r) is monotonically increasing in r. Therefore, if for r =¯ r,
Γ(δ,β, ¯ r) >
3−2β
4(1−β) − δ, then there exists a threshold r∗ ∈ [˜ r,r) such that:










If for r =¯ r, Γ(δ,β, ¯ r) ≤
3−2β





Substituting the value of ¯ r and checking the inequality, it can be shown that there exists a





such that Γ(δ,β, ¯ r) ≤
3−2β
4(1−β) − δ i fa n do n l yi fβ ≥ ˜ β.
Summarizing:





GP for every value of r ∈ [0, ¯ r].
• If β ≥ 1+4δ
2+4δ there exists a threshold r∗ ∈ [˜ r,r] such that:










With r∗ ∈ [˜ r,r) if β ≤ ˜ β, and r∗ =¯ r if β > ˜ β.
This completes the proof.













[δ (1 − β)+r(1 − δ)β] > 0.
































































































== ⎨ ++ ⎩
^ P  










== ⎨ ++ ⎩
^ P  
0, . s p == ^ P
0, . s p = = ^ P
0, . s p = = ^ P
0, . s p = = ^ P
, . gg s Tp p l = =++ ^ P
, . g gs R pp = =+ ^ P
, . gg s Tp p l = =++ ^ P













^ P  













^ P  
, . g gs R pp = =+ ^ P
, . g TB p = += ^ P
, . g TB p = += ^ P
, . g gs R pp = =+ ^ P
, . g gs R pp = =+ ^ P
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